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Abstract 
Attentional biases in anxiety disorders have been assessed primarily using three types 
of experiment: the emotional Stroop task, the probe-detection task, and variations of 
the visual search task. It is proposed that the inattentional blindness procedure has the 
ability to overcome limitations of these paradigms in regard to identifying the 
components of attentional bias. Three experiments examined attentional responding to 
spider images in individuals with low and moderate to high spider fear. The results 
demonstrate that spider fear causes a bias in the engage component of visual attention 
and this is specific to stimuli presented in the left visual field (i.e., to the right 
hemisphere). The implications of the results are discussed and recommendations for 
future research are made.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
Noticing spiders on the left: evidence on attentional bias and spider fear  
in the inattentional blindness paradigm 
 
Evolutionary perspectives of fear suggest that it is an adaptive process enabling the 
detection of (and subsequent escape from) threat, particularly biologically relevant 
threatening stimuli such as spiders, snakes and angry faces (e.g., LeDoux, 1996; 
Öhman, 2006) which elicit enhanced attention even in  human infants (Boyer & 
Bergstrom, in press) and in other species.  
 
The detection of potential threat has obvious evolutionary utility and has been 
displayed in a range of species. In birds, chicks with lateralised brains, with a left eye 
(right hemisphere) dominance, are faster to detect threat appearing on the left during a 
food discrimination task (Rogers, Zucca & Vallortigara, 2004), display greater 
sensitivity to human faces (Rosa Salva, Regolin & Vallortigara, 2012) and gaze (Rosa 
Salva, Regolin & Vallortigara, 2007), respond to images appearing from the left with 
greater approach and attack responses (Rogers, 2000) and exhibit more distress calls 
(Rogers, 1997). Similarly, magpies showed a left eye (right hemisphere) bias to 
escape from potential threat and a right eye (left hemisphere) bias to approach threat 
(Koboroff, Kaplan & Rogers, 2008). 
 
Fish demonstrate an initial bias to turn left when a predator appears, but after repeated 
testing turned right, which may reflect an inborn tendency to look at fearful stimuli 
with the left eye due to right hemisphere dominance (Cantalupo, Bisazza & 
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Vallortigara, 1995).  Rats using the left eye only (and the right hemisphere) are shown 
to be as effective at detecting escape routes as animals using both eyes (Rogers, 
1997).  
 
Dogs have demonstrated similar lateralisation effects when presented with stimuli of 
varying emotional valence (Siniscalchi, Sasso, Pepe, Vallortigara & Quaranta, 2010). 
Results showed that dogs turned left more frequently to silhouettes representing 
snakes and cats, but no differences were found when the dogs were presented with 
images of other dogs. Tail wagging has also been demonstrated to be affected by the 
emotional valence of stimuli. Quaranta, Siniscalchi and Vallortigara (2011) found that 
dogs wagged their tails with greater amplitude to the right (demonstrating a left 
hemisphere bias) in response to owners, but with lower amplitude to the right when 
presented with cats, and to the left (right hemisphere bias) in response to a unfamiliar 
dominant dog, which suggests avoidance behaviour. Similarly, Siniscalchi, Sasso, 
Pepe, Dimatteo, Vallortigara and Quaranta (2011) found that dogs sniffed with the 
right nostril when they were presented with potentially aversive stimuli, such as 
vetenary sweat or adrenaline, which again suggests escape and avoidance behaviour 
mediated by the right hemisphere. 
 
In  human participants responses to threat  can be especially exaggerated. Cognitive 
models of anxiety disorders suggest that people with elevated anxiety will, via 
preattentive processes, rapidly allocate their visual attention to threatening objects 
(e.g., Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg & IJzendoorn, 2007; 
Cisler & Koster, 2010; Eysenck, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Peira, Golkar, 
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Larsson, & Wiens, 2010; Williams, et al., 1988; 1997). Evidence informing these 
theoretical accounts comes primarily from three paradigms: the emotional Stroop 
task, the probe-detection task and variations of the visual search task.  
 
Before considering the experimental evidence for attentional biases in more detail, a 
brief summary of “attention” is required. Attention clearly involves multiple 
distributed brain networks  (Posner, Rueda, & Kanske, 2007) reflecting both 
endogenous (top-down) and exogenous (bottom-up) processes (Hopfinger & West, 
2006), but one classic view (Posner & Petersen, 1990) is that the attentional system is 
comprised of three main facets or mechanisms. The initial orienting of attention to an 
object is controlled by the engage component. The removal of attention from an 
object is controlled by the disengage component. The shift component controls the 
movement of attention between different objects or areas in visual space. These 
individual components have not been fully accounted for in the literature on 
attentional biases in anxiety.  
 
In reference to the methods used to inform cognitive models of attentional biases in 
anxiety disorders, the emotional Stroop task has largely been abandoned because its 
relevance to the attentional system has been questioned. For example, Williams et al. 
(1997) suggest that the colour naming latency displayed by anxious individuals when 
threatening words or pictures are presented may reflect processes beyond the 
attentional system, such as self-referential activity. Due to the interpretation 
difficulties with the Stroop task, the probe-detection task was developed (MacLeod, 
Matthews & Tata, 1986). During a probe detection task, participants are presented 
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with two images simultaneously in either a horizontal or vertical configuration. After 
a delay, the images offset the screen and a probe replaces one of them. Participants 
are instructed to locate the probe as quickly as possible. Response times are taken as 
an index of where visual attention was allocated when the probe appeared.  
 
Findings from the probe-detection task show that anxious individuals are faster to 
detect the probe when it replaces a threatening image in comparison with neutral 
images (within-participants design) or in comparison to low anxious control 
participants (between-participants design). Biases towards threatening images have 
been demonstrated in social phobia (Mogg, Philipott & Bradley 2004; Pishyar, Harris 
& Menzies, 2004a; Pishyar, Harris & Menzies, 2004b), spider phobia (Mogg & 
Bradley, 2006) and elevated trait anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Wilson & 
MacLeod, 2003). There is also evidence to suggest that such biases are mediated by 
the right hemisphere (Fox, 2002; Mogg & Bradley, 2002) but the time taken to detect 
the probe does not provide an index of where visual attention is initially allocated 
(Fox, Russo, Bowles & Dutton , 2001). As such, it is unclear whether the initial 
“engage” component of visual attention is biased towards threat in anxiety states. 
 
Attempts have been made to circumvent this problem. One method has been to reduce 
the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) from the traditional 500ms (MacLeod et al., 
1986) to briefer durations. For example, Mogg and Bradley (2006) found an 
attentional bias towards spiders in spider fearful individuals at 200ms. Nevertheless, 
endogenous shifts in attention between stimuli can still operate within this time 
period, so it is not certain which stimulus is initially prioritised by the attentional 
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system. The use of eye tracking methods to assess initial orienting share a similar 
problem. Retinal fixation is an imprecise measure of where visual attention is 
allocated because attention can move independently from eye movements (Mack & 
Rock, 1998). Thus, experiments are required that more precisely measure the engage 
component of visual attention.  
 
Visual search tasks (Rinck, Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, & Becker, 2005) go some way 
to overcoming problems with the probe-detection task. In visual search tasks, 
participants are presented with a matrix of images; one image is the feared object 
(e.g., a spider) and the other images are innocuous (e.g., flowers). The time taken to 
detect the threatening image reflects the processing strategy participants are 
employing. Faster detection times regardless of the number of distractor or non-target 
items reflect rapid parallel processing, which is more likely to reflect biases in the 
engage component of visual attention. Slower detection times with increasing number 
of distractors are said to reflect serial search.  
 
Different variations of the visual search task have been used to explore attention to 
phobic stimuli. These variations relate to the prior exposure of the stimulus to the 
participant. For example, Rinck, et al. (2005) suggest that studies can be divided into 
those that present the participant with the object beforehand (e.g., showing 
participants an image of a spider and then asking them to locate it during the 
experiment). This is termed the target search task. The second method involves the 
participant being asked to find the incongruent stimulus, without being informed what 
the image will be. This is termed the odd-one-out task. Results from both methods 
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have demonstrated target detection biases in social phobia (Rinck & Becker, 2005) 
elevated trait anxiety (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995) and spider fear (Miltner, Krieschel, 
Hecht, Trippe & Weiss, 2004). Nonetheless, the prior presentation of stimuli, whether 
by showing the image before hand, or by verbal instruction that one might appear, is 
problematic. This is because, in real life situations, it is unlikely that even people will 
be constantly (and consciously) vigilant for, for example, spiders on a moment-to-
moment basis. Thus, a more ecologically valid measure of visual attention towards 
feared objects is required. 
 
To summarise, further work is needed to more precisely examine the role of the 
engage component of visual attention in regard to feared stimuli and increases in the 
ecological validity of methods are required. Additionally, further inspection of 
lateralisation effects in response to threat in humans is required. A method that has the 
potential to achieve these requirements is the inattentional blindness paradigm. 
Inattentional blindness experiments have been used to demonstrate that objects 
appearing within a person’s visual field can go undetected when a person is engaged 
on a concurrent but unrelated visual task (Mack & Rock, 1998). In this task, 
participants are presented with a series of cross images at fixation and must judge 
whether the horizontal or vertical line is longest within 200ms. On the final trial, an 
unexpected object is presented in one of the quadrants defined by the cross. After the 
experiment, participants are asked if they noticed the additional object. Rates of 
inattentional blindness vary depending on the nature of the unexpected stimulus. 
Schematic smiling faces drew the attention of the majority of participants in Mack 
and Rock’s (1998) experiments. However, when the direction of the mouth was 
reversed to show a sad expression, the majority of participants missed the stimulus. 
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Crucially, due to the object being unexpected and presented simultaneously with the 
distraction task, noticing the object is directly related to the engage component of 
visual attention. Furthermore, due to the novel and unexpected nature of the stimulus 
and the cross judgement task being presented centrally, there is a greater level of 
control over where the stimulus is placed, which allows for a more systematic 
investigation of the roles of the left and right hemispheres of the brain. 
 
To our knowledge, only one study has been published that uses the inattentional 
blindness task to study attentional bias in anxiety disorders (Lee & Telch, 2008). The 
findings showed that social phobia was correlated with noticing negative facial 
expressions. However, prior to the experiment, participants were screened for social 
anxiety, which may have primed them and artificially elevated noticing rates. 
Secondly, the cross judgement task was presented in the parafovea and the critical 
stimulus appeared at fixation. This means that attention had to move from the fixation 
point to the cross. For the object to be noticed, attention would have to return to the 
area originally attended. Thus, Lee and Telch’s (2008) results may better be 
conceptualised as fear relevant stimuli breaking through the Inhibition of Return 
phenomena, and thus may reflect a bias in the shift component of visual attention. The 
present series of experiments were designed to examine the role of the engage 
component of attention, while eliminating the role of expectation that a feared object 
will be presented, and varying the location of the stimulus to further investigate the 
roles of the left and right hemispheres of the brain. 
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The particular category of feared stimuli to be employed is that of spiders since they 
may have a special threat significance (Gerdes, Uhl, & Alpers, 2009) inducing high 
levels of disgust in spider phobics (Olatunji, Cisler, Meunier, Connolly, & Lohr, 
2008). Even young infants have been shown to display attentional bias to spiders 
(Boyer & Bergstrom, in press; Rakison & Derringer, 2008) consistent with an innate 
disposition to respond to such stimuli, although aversive learning may account for the 
development of spider phobia (Purkis & Lipp, 2009). In any case, spider images 
would seem to offer a robust tool for exploring attentional bias to fear-inducing 
stimuli. 
 
Experiment 1 
Introduction 
The aim of the first experiment was to examine the utility of the inattentional 
blindness experiment to examine attentional biases in spider fear. The hypothesis that 
spider fearful individuals notice a spider image when it is presented against 
expectation was examined. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 25 males and 25 females recruited from members of the public 
visiting ‘At-Bristol’ Science Museum, UK, (mean age 37, SD = 10.2). All participants 
had normal or corrected to normal vision; none of the participants reported a history 
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of neurological trauma or disease. The data from one participant was excluded due to 
an indecipherable response. Therefore, the total participants for this experiment were 
49. After the experiment, none of the participants reported knowledge of the static 
inattentional blindness experiment. The study received ethical approval from a local 
ethics committee.  
 
Materials 
All of the images were displayed in the centre of a white circle (10.6cm) on a black 
background using E-Prime V1.2 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc). The first image 
was an asterisk in the centre of the circle (0.6), serving as the fixation point 
(displayed for 1500ms). The second image consisted of two bisecting lines of 
different length (displayed for 200ms). The long line measured 4cm and subtended a 
visual angle of 4.6. The small line measured 3.5cm and subtended a visual angle of 
4. The third image was a visual mask consisting of black and white shapes 
(displayed for 500ms), which covered the area of the screen previously defined by the 
circle. This sequence of image was presented four times. The unexpected critical 
stimulus (the spider) appeared along with the cross judgement task on the fourth trial. 
The spider represented a visual angle of 0.7 and was placed at a distance of 2.5cm 
(2.9 eccentricity) in the bottom right quadrant of the cross.  
 
The experiment was separated into three stages. Participants were first presented with 
the inattention stage. This was when the dependent variable (i.e., noticing of the 
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critical stimulus) was recorded. The experimenter asked questions to ascertain 
whether the critical stimulus had been perceived. The questions were: 
1. ‘Did you notice anything additional on the screen that time?’ 
2. If yes: ‘Where was it located?’; If no: ‘Did you see anything in the bottom right 
side of the screen?’ 
3. If yes: ‘Can you tell me what it was?’ If no: ‘Proceed to next trial’. 
 
In order to ensure that the stimulus was perceptible under different attentional 
conditions, two further stages were conducted. The second stage was the divided 
attention trial. Participants were asked to judge which line was longest while being 
instructed to look for anything additional to the cross. The third stage was the full 
attention trial. Here, the participants were instructed to ignore the line judgement task 
and look for anything additional that might appear on the screen. Data from these 
trials were recorded but later discarded. If any of the participants had failed to notice 
the spider on the full attention stage, their data from the inattention stage would have 
been discarded1.  
 
A forced choice test was used after the computer task to further examine object 
recognition and implicit perception (see figure 1). A card contained five distinct 
images of equal size that were randomly positioned on the card. Three images were 
geometric objects (circle, triangle, square). The remaining two images were the spider 
appearing in the experiment and a reconfigured image of the spider. Depending upon 
responses, participants were asked to select the image they noticed (participants 
classified as identifiers), or the stimulus that might have appeared (participants 
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classified as ‘detectors’) or at random (participants classified as ‘inattentionally 
blind’). 
 
After the computer task, participants also completed the Fear of Spiders 
Questionnaire (FSQ: Szysmanski & O’Donohue, 1995) and the depression subscale of 
the Hospital Anxiety and Depression (HAD) scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). Both 
scales are included at the end of the manuscript. 
< insert figure 1 about here> 
 
Design 
Participants were separated into two non-overlapping groups depending on scores 
from the FSQ. Participants scoring equal to or greater than 30 were allocated to the 
moderate to high fear group, and participants scoring equal to or less than 29 were 
categorised as having low fear. This separation was based on the mean score across 
the sample for the first experiment. There are inconsistencies in the literature with cut 
off points for the FSQ, with different authors using different separation points 
(Huiding & de Jong, 2006; Cochrane, Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2008). 
However, across all of the experiments described here, the cut-off-points between low 
and moderate to high fear remained the same.  
 
Participants were also separated into different, non-overlapping noticing categories 
(inattentionally blind, detector, identifier) on the inattention stage of the experiments. 
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Participants were categorised as inattentionally blind if they said they did not see 
anything, or if they reported an event that did not occur (for example, that the cross 
had moved). They were categorised as detectors if they verbally identified an object 
in the correct quadrant of the cross but were unable to say what it was. Finally, they 
were categorised as identifiers if they correctly identified the location and verbally 
identified the spider (“bug” and “insect” were also accepted). The forced choice test 
was used to further categorise participants. Because spider fearful individuals may be 
reluctant to output the word “spider” (Williams et al., 1998), participants who were 
able to detect the correct location and correctly identified the object on the forced 
choice test were classified as identifiers. This resulted in a 2 (fear group: low vs. 
moderate-high) x 3 (noticing category: inattentionally blind vs. detector vs. identifier) 
design. All analyses were conducted using multidimensional chi-square tests. Fisher’s 
exact test is reported where expected frequencies were less than 5. Statistical power is 
reported using the phi statistic (), which is used to measure the level of association 
between two variables (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). In line with conventions in 
psychology, correlation coefficients of 0.4 and below were regarded as low, 0.5 to 0.7 
as medium and effects larger than 0.8 as high. 
 
Procedure 
Visitors attending the science museum were approached and invited to participate in 
an experiment ‘designed to examine the link between perception and emotion’. No 
information regarding the presentation of the spider was given. The participants were 
provided with a set of standardised instructions and, upon confirmation of 
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understanding, asked to place their chin on a chin rest (50cm from the screen) and 
began a single practice trial. 
 
The experimenter initiated each of the trials across the inattention, divided attention 
and full attention stages. After the task had offset the screen, participants were asked 
to report which line was longest. These data were recorded to ensure the instructions 
were understood, but were later discarded. After the fourth trial when the spider was 
presented, participants were asked if they noticed anything additional to the cross on 
the screen and their responses were categorised and recorded. After the computerised 
task, the participants were asked to complete the forced-choice and psychometric 
measures. 
 
Results 
When the participants were separated into low (n = 37) and moderate to high (n = 12) 
fear groups, Mann-Whitney tests revealed that the groups differed significantly on the 
FSQ (U = .000, N1 = 37, N2 =12, p = .00) but not on depression (U = 181.500, N1 = 
37, N2 = 12, p = .34). A multidimensional chi square test with an exact option found 
no significant association between the fear groups and noticing categories (2 = .166, 
df = 2, p =  1.0  = .02) on the inattention trial. The divided and full attention stages 
were not inferentially analysed. Table 1 presents the noticing rates for the low and 
moderate to high fear of spiders groups on the inattention trial. 
< Insert table 1 about here > 
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Discussion 
The analysis of association between fear status and noticing categories did not reveal 
a significant effect. Specifically, the hypothesis that elevated fear would be associated 
with increased identification rates, was not supported. However, this may have been 
caused by the size of the stimulus, which was relatively small. Therefore, in 
experiment 2, the size of the stimulus was increased.   
 
Experiment 2 
Introduction 
The previous experiment yielded no significant association between fear status and 
noticing rates on the inattentional blindness experiment. However, anecdotal reports 
from spider fearful individuals suggest that the degree of fear they experience 
depends upon the size of the spider. Therefore, the purpose of the second experiment 
was to examine whether a larger spider would increase identification rates in spider 
fearful individuals.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were 21 males and 28 females (mean age 37, SD =13.6) and were 
recruited from the Cheltenham Science Festival. All participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision; no participants reported a history of neurological trauma 
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or disease and no participants reported having epilepsy. After the experiment, none of 
the participants reported knowing the static inattentional blindness paradigm.  
 
Materials 
In this experiment, the critical spider stimulus measured 0.9cm and subtended a visual 
angle of 1. This was chosen because it is below the 1.1 retinal size threshold 
reported by Mack and Rock (1998). Again, the spider appeared in the bottom right 
quadrant of the cross, 2.5cm (2.9 eccentricity) from fixation. The forced choice test 
was modified in line with the spider size increase. All other materials remained the 
same as experiment 1.  
 
Procedure and Design 
Members of the public attending the science festival were approached and asked if 
they would be willing to participate in a study ‘examining the link between perception 
and emotion’. No further details about the hypothesis were given. The same cut-off 
points used for the FSQ in experiment one were used in experiment two. All other 
elements of the procedure and design remained the same as the previous experiment. 
 
Results 
When the participants were separated into moderate to high (n = 13) and low (n = 36) 
fear groups using the FSQ, the groups differed significantly on the FSQ  (U = .000, 
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N1 = 36, N2 =13, p = .00) but not on depression (U = 227.000 N1 = 36, N2 =13, p = 
.87). 
 
A multidimensional chi-square test with exact significance option revealed no 
significant association between fear status and noticing categories (2 = 1.761, df = 2, 
p = .48,  = .19) on the inattention trial. The divided and full attention stages were not 
subjected to inferential analyses. Table 2 presents the noticing rates for both the low 
and moderate to high fear of spiders groups on the inattention trial.  
<  Insert table 2 about here > 
 
Discussion 
Analysis of the relationship between fear status and noticing categories or rates 
revealed no significant association. In particular, the predicted association between 
elevated fear status and spider detection was not observed. The results suggest that 
despite an increase in size, individuals with heightened fear of spiders do not display 
an engagement bias towards spiders. However, there is evidence to suggest that the 
left visual field (right hemisphere) may be more specialised for detecting threat in a 
range of different species (Cantalupo et al., 1995; Koboroff et al., 2008; Quaranta et 
al., 2011; Rogers, 1997, 2000; Rogers et al., 2004; Roso Salva et al., 2012; Siniscalchi 
et al., 2010) and this may be particularly so for people with elevated anxiety. For 
example, Fox (2002) and Mogg and Bradley (2002) suggest that the right cerebral 
hemisphere might be more sensitive to threat detection. In the final experiment, the 
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spider image was therefore moved to the left visual field (left quadrant of the cross) 
and so initially processed in the left cerebral hemisphere.  
 
Experiment 3 
Introduction 
The previous two experiments suggest that spider fearful individuals do not exhibit 
biases in the engage component of visual attention when spiders are presented against 
expectation. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that the left and right cerebral 
hemispheres have different roles in threat detection, with the right cerebral hemisphere 
(and left visual field) displaying greater sensitivity, both in other species (e.g., Rogers, 
1997) and in anxiety states (Fox, 2002; Mogg & Bradley, 2002). The previous 
experiments placed the spider image in the right visual field and thus projected the 
image to the left cerebral hemisphere. The current experiment places the same spider 
image as experiment two in the left visual field (left quadrant of the cross) to examine 
the role of the right hemisphere.  
 
Method 
Participants 
The participants for the experiment were 21 males and 25 females (mean age 37, SD 
= 15.2), recruited from members of the public visiting the Glasgow Science Centre. 
All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. No participants reported a 
history of neurological trauma or disease, and no participants reported having 
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epilepsy. After the experiment, none of the participants reported knowing the static 
inattentional blindness paradigm.  
 
Materials 
In this experiment, the spider appeared in the bottom left quadrant of the cross, 2.5cm 
(2.9 eccentricity) from fixation. Other than this modification, the spider stimulus 
remained the same as in experiment two, measuring 0.9cm and subtending a visual 
angle of 1. The forced choice was the same as was used in experiment two. All other 
materials remained the same as the previous experiments.   
 
Procedure and Design 
Members of the public attending Glasgow Science Museum were approached and 
asked if they would be willing to participate in a study ‘examining the link between 
perception and emotion’. No further details about the hypothesis were given. The 
FSQ cut-off points remained the same as the previous experiments. All other elements 
of the procedure and design remained the same as the previous experiments.  
 
Results 
When the participants were separated into moderate to high (n =19) and low (n = 27) 
spider fear using the FSQ, the groups differed significantly on the FSQ (U = .000, N1 
= 27, N2 =19, p = .00) and depression (U = 167.500, N1 = 27, N2 =19, p = .05). 
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In contrast to the analyses for the previous two experiments, a multidimensional chi-
square test with exact significance option revealed a significant effect between 
noticing categories and fear status (2 = 9.916, df = 2, p = .01,  = .46). Table 3 
presents the noticing rates for both the moderate to high and low spider fear groups on 
the critical inattention trial.  
< Insert table 3 about here > 
Post-hoc comparisons on the noticing categories were then conducted for each of the 
fear groups separately. The low spider fear group revealed a significant effect (2 = 
8.222, df = 2, p = .02). Follow-up analyses for this group were conducted on the 
comparison of interest, between the inattentionally blind and identifier participants 
and this was also significant (2 = 4.545, df = 1, p = .03), reflecting the greater rate of 
inattentional blindness for this group.  
 
Comparisons of the noticing categories were also conducted for the moderate to high 
spider fear group. A chi-square test revealed an overall significant effect in this case as 
well (2 = 11.789, df = 2, p = .00). Follow-up analyses were conducted between the 
inattentionally blind and identifier groups and revealed a marginally significant effect 
(2 = 3.556, df = 1, p = .06), reflecting the greater “identifier” rates for this group.  
 
Discussion 
The results from experiment three present a different picture to the previous 
experiments. The analysis revealed a significant effect between fear status and 
 23 
noticing categories. The follow-up analysis of interest was between the inattentionally 
blind and identifier participants. In the case of the low fear group, significantly more 
of the participants were inattentionally blind. In the case of the moderate to high fear 
group, this pattern was reversed. Specifically, more of the participants in this group 
noticed, and were able to correctly identify, the unexpected spider image. Although 
the analysis of interest in the moderate to high fear group only approached 
significance, the overall pattern of results supports the hypothesis that increased 
spider fear will lead to the rapid identification of spiders appearing in the left visual 
field (left quadrant of the cross) during an inattentional blindness task. Conversely, 
the results from the low fear group suggest that spiders will be bypassed by the 
attentional system if they are not perceived as particularly threatening. 
 
  
General Discussion 
The purpose of the current series of experiments was to examine whether individuals 
with elevated fear of spiders notice spiders in a rapid experimental task where the 
spiders are presented against expectation. An additional purpose was to examine 
specifically the roles of the left and right cerebral hemispheres in threat detection. The 
confirmation of  an attentional bias, mediated by the right cerebral hemisphere in 
experiment three is an important finding because previous methods used to explore 
such attentional biases have lacked specificity to the attentional system (i.e., the 
Stroop task; Williams et al., 1997), have been imprecise regarding the components of 
visual attention (i.e., as in the probe-detection task; Fox et al., 2001), or have lacked 
specificity to particular cerebral hemispheres. Additionally, no previous methods have 
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examined attentional response to threatening and unexpected stimuli. The results 
from the first two experiments failed to confirm the hypothesis that elevated fear of 
spiders causes the rapid engagement of spider stimuli. However, in the case of the 
first experiment, it is possible that the size of the stimulus was not sufficient to have 
an effect. Nevertheless in the case of the second experiment, where the size of the 
stimulus was increased, a rapid engagement bias for spider images was still not found. 
In experiment 3, the spider stimulus was moved to the left visual field (left quadrant 
of the cross) on the grounds of evidence of hemispheric biases in different species 
(Cantalupo et al., 1995; Koboroff et al., 2008; Quaranta et al., 2011; Rogers, 1997, 
2000; Rogers et al., 2004; Roso Salva et al., 2012; Siniscalchi et al., 2010)  and some 
evidence indicating this might be the case in anxiety disorders (Fox, 2002; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2002). In this case, the results do support the hypothesis that elevated spider 
fear causes the rapid engagement of spiders when they are presented against 
expectation and appear in the left visual field.  
 
This finding of hemispheric asymmetry is supportive of prior evidence that attentional 
biases to threat are more pronounced in the right hemisphere (Fox, 2002; Mogg and 
Bradley, 2002). These results are consistent with suggestions that the right 
hemisphere may be more vigilant in general than the left (Arruda et al., 1999), more 
responsive to stressors, particularly after stressful events (Adamec, 2003), and shows 
greater activation than the left hemisphere to threatening stimuli both in other species, 
including birds (e.g., Koboroff et al., 2008; Rogers, 1997, 2000; Rogers et al., 2004), 
rats (Rogers, 1997), fish (Cantalupo et al., 1995) and dogs (Quaranta et al., 2011; 
Siniscalchi et al., 2010; Siniscalchi et al., 2011) and in human anxiety states (Fox, 
2002; Mogg & Bradley, 2002). Additionally, the right hemisphere may be more 
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involved in negative emotional arousal at both the subcortical and cortical levels 
(Davidson, 2002; Gainotti, 1972; Moses, Houck, Martin, Hanlon, et al., 2007).   
 
This result has methodological implications for the need to explore both left and right 
visual fields in assessing response to phobic stimuli. More importantly however, such 
findings are of value to understanding the way in which the attentional systems 
operate in the brain. Firstly, evidence suggests that the left eye (right hemisphere) 
may have be specialised for more global processing (Rogers 2000). In terms of the 
current findings, it may be the case that spiders need to be processed globally in order 
to induce a rapid fear based response. Secondly, the results are important because they 
demonstrate that even fear-inducing stimuli do not necessarily capture both 
hemispheres during the initial engagement of attention. It is of interest that 
hemispheric division of labour can occur even under conditions of perceived threat.  
 
The findings from experiment 3 are more likely to reflect biases in the initial engage 
component of attention than results from other paradigms such as probe-detection 
tasks, which typically have longer SOAs of 500ms. Such studies may be better 
conceptualised as reflecting biases in the disengage component of visual attention 
because they permit the switching of attentional resources between stimuli (Field & 
Cox, 2008; Fox et al., 2001). In contrast, the results from experiment 3 with SOAs of 
200ms support those presented by Mogg and Bradley (2006; experiment 1), who 
found an attentional bias to spiders in a probe detection task with an SOA of 200ms, 
more indicative of the engage component of attention. The present results extend our 
knowledge of attentional biases in spider fear beyond this prior evidence. The short 
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presentation time, the lack of task relevancy of the spider image, and its covert 
presentation, reduces the possibility that the participants were controlling their visual 
processing resources towards the stimulus. As such, the method is more likely to 
reflect bottom-up processes, providing greater certainty that detection of the spider 
image in the group with elevated spider fear was due to the engage component of 
visual attention.   
 
The findings from the current study also extend the findings from visual search tasks 
of the kind  employed by Miltner et al. (2004) where mushrooms were the target 
object and spiders the distractors. Presenting a spider at the same time as the target 
mushroom caused the spider-fearful participants to orient their gaze to the spider 
before they located the mushroom, suggesting a particular sensitivity to the spiders. 
However in other conditions, the spider was the target stimulus and so was task-
relevant, which may have influenced expectation. The current series of experiments 
extend the findings of such studies by employing the inattentional blindness paradigm 
to minimize expectation. The fearful participants in experiment 3 identified the spider 
even though there was no reason for them to believe that one would be present.  
 
In minimizing expectation, the inattentional blindness paradigm provides greater 
ecological validity than other procedures for assessing attentional bias to phobic 
stimuli such as spiders. Future assessments of attentional bias to spiders could 
however increase ecological validity even further by employing moving fearful 
images in dynamic inattentional blindness tasks (e.g., Simons & Chabris, 1999). 
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One point of interest with the current results is that the third experiment differs from 
the previous two in that the participants with elevated spider fear also showed higher 
depression scores on the HAD scale. Cognitive models of depression and anxiety 
suggest that they have different effects on the cognitive system. Anxiety is suggested 
to result in an “outward focus”, influencing processing in  the perceptual and 
attentional systems and resulting in increased vigilance for threat. Depression on the 
other hand is suggested to have an “inward focus”, resulting, for example, in greater 
recall of negative memories. Clinical evidence suggests that depression and anxiety 
have a high co-morbidity and this may account for the current findings (Williams et 
al., 1998).  
 
To summarise, the results from the present study overcome interpretation difficulties 
associated with other methods for assessing attention to feared stimuli. In particular, 
the rapid presentation times and covert presentation of the spider stimulus allow for 
assessment of the engage component of visual attention. The current results suggest 
that under these conditions, people with an elevated fear of spiders will rapidly detect 
them even when not expected, provided that the spiders appear in the left visual field 
and so are initially presented to the right hemisphere.  
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Table 1. Noticing rates for the low and moderate to high fear groups on the 
inattention trial for experiment 1. 
                                                                Response Type 
Fear of spiders         
                             Inattentionally blind          Detector                      Identifier 
Low fear of 
spiders 
    21 (57%) 6 (16%) 10 (27%) 
Moderate to high 
fear of spiders  
     7 (41%) 7 (41%) 3 (18%) 
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Table 2. Noticing rates for the low and moderate to high fear groups on the 
inattention trial for experiment 2.  
                                                                   Response Type 
 Spider fear            
                              Inattentionally blind        Detector                     Identifier 
Low fear of spiders   18 (50%) 9 (25%) 9 (25%) 
Moderate to high 
fear of spiders  
    8 (62%) 1 (8%) 4 (30%) 
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Table 3. Noticing rates for the low and moderate to high fear groups on the 
inattention trial for experiment 3. 
                                                                     Response Type 
Spider fear            
                              Inattentionally blind         Detector                    Identifier 
Low spider fear 16 (59%) 5 (19%) 6 (22%) 
Moderate to high 
spider fear 
5 (26%) 1 (5%) 13 (68%) 
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Figure 1. Force choice test including the spider image included in the experiment on 
the critical inattention, divided attention and full attention trials. 
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Appendix A. The Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ). 
Fear of Spiders Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire is designed to assess your fear of spiders. Please read it 
carefully and respond to all questions.  
1 = not like me; 7 = more like me. 
 
1 If I came across a spider now, I would get help from 
someone else to remove it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 Currently, I am sometimes on the look out for spiders. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 If I saw a spider now, I would think it will harm me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I now think a lot about spiders 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 I would be somewhat afraid to enter a room now, 
where I have seen a spider before. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I now would do anything to try and avoid a spider 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 Currently, I sometimes think about getting bit by a 
spider 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 If I encountered a spider now, I wouldn’t be able to 
deal effectively with it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 If I encountered a spider now, it would take a long 
time to get it out of my mind, 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 If I came across a spider now, I would leave the room 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 If I saw a spider now, I would think it would try to 
jump on me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 If I saw a spider now, I would ask someone else to kill 
it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 If I encountered a spider now, I would have images of 
it trying to get me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 If I saw a spider now, I would be afraid of it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 If I saw a spider now, I would feel very panicky. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 Spiders are one of my worst fears. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17  Would feel very y nervous if I saw a spider now. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18 If I saw a spider now, I would probably break out in a 
sweat and my heart would beat faster.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix B. The depression subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression (HAD) 
Scale. 
1. I feel cheerful: 
 
Most of the time                                                                                                                                              
 
A lot of the time                                                                           
 
Time to time, occasionally                                                              
 
Not at all                                                                                        
2. I have lost interest in my appearance: 
 
Not at all                                                                                         
 
Not often                                                                                        
 
Sometimes                                                                                     
 
Most of the time                                                                           
3. I feel as if I am slowed down: 
 
Nearly all of the time                                                                  
 
Very often                                                                                     
 
Sometimes                                                                                    
 
Not at all                                                                                        
4. I look forward to things with enjoyment: 
 
As much as I ever did                                                                   
 
Rather less than I used to                                                           
 
Definitely less than I used to                                                     
 
Hardly at all                                                                                  
5. I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy: 
  
Definitely as much                                                                       
 
Not quite so much now                                                              
 
Only a little                                                                                   
 
Hardly at all                                                                                  
6. I can laugh and see the funny side of things: 
 
As much as I always could                                                         
 
Not quite so much now                                                             
 
Definitely not so much now                                                      
 
Not at all now                                                                              
7. I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV 
programme: 
 
Often                                                                                             
 
Sometimes                                                                                   
 
Not often                                                                                      
 
Very seldom                                                                                 
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1 Across the three experiments presented here, all of the participants noticed the spider 
image on the full attention stages of the experiments. 
 
 
